Operationalizing ‘Policy Capacity’: A Case Study of Climate Change Adaptation in Canadian Finance Agencies by Williams, Russell Alan
 Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2012, 65-74 65 	  
	  
 
Operationalizing ‘Policy Capacity’: 
A Case Study of Climate Change Adaptation  
in Canadian Finance Agencies 
 
Russell Alan Williams 
Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland. E-mail address: russellw@mun.ca 
 
 
Abstract. Although a widely used term in the literature, 
much of what we know about “policy capacity” in govern-
ment is limited to anecdotal evidence. Policy scholars have 
not systematically investigated the ability of policy profes-
sionals to provide good advice in relation to new policy chal-
lenges; indeed many are skeptical that policy capacity (un-
derstood as the potential for “evidence based policy learn-
ing”) is an important driver of policy change in the first 
place. Despite these empirical and theoretical problems, 
governments remain committed to improving policy capacity 
in the pursuit of better public policy.  This paper offers some 
preliminary observations on the difficulty of studying and 
operationalizing policy capacity through an examination of 
the finance sector in relation to climate change adaptation; 
part of a large collaborative SSHRC CEI project.  Drawing on 
the existing literature on Canadian finance policymaking 
dynamics, a survey of policy professionals in the area, and an 
illustrative case study, the paper makes two claims.  It sug-
gests that viewing capacity as involving both the cognitive 
skills of professionals (or “analytical capacity”), and the 
institutional arrangements in which policy research is con-
ducted (or “governance arrangements”), is a useful starting 
point. However, as the findings in this paper highlight, if 
capacity is the ability to provide effective advice in relation to 
specific problems, then the nature of the problem itself (how 
“wicked” or otherwise it might be) will also impact capacity. 
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Résumé. Bien qu’il soit abondamment utilisé dans la littéra-
ture, ce que nous savons à propos de la « capacité 
d’élaboration des politiques publiques » reste anecdotique. 
Les chercheurs en politiques publiques n’ont pas examiné 
systématiquement l’aptitude des professionnels des poli-
tiques publiques à fournir des conseils pertinents concernant 
les nouveaux défis de politiques publiques ; d’ailleurs, nom-
breux sont ceux qui doutent que la capacité d’élaboration des 
politiques publiques (entendue comme le potentiel pour un 
« apprentissage des politiques publiques fondé sur les 
faits ») soit un moteur important de changement dans le 
domaine des politiques publiques. Malgré ces problèmes 
empiriques et théoriques, les gouvernements restent engagés 
à améliorer la capacité d’élaboration des politiques pu-
bliques, dans le but de consolider les politiques publiques. 
Cet article offre quelques observations préliminaires 
s’agissant de la difficulté d’étudier et d’opérationnaliser la 
capacité d’élaboration des politiques publiques à travers 
l’examen du secteur financier en lien avec l’adaptation au 
changement climatique ; ceci est le produit partiel du vaste 
projet de recherche CRSH CEI. En se fondant sur la littéra-
ture existante sur les dynamiques de l’élaboration des poli-
tiques dans la finance canadienne, sur une enquête sur les 
professionnels des politiques publiques dans ce domaine, et 
sur un cas d’étude explicatif, cet article formule deux propo-
sitions. Il suggère que regarder la capacité comme impli-
quant à la fois les compétences cognitives des professionnels 
(ou « capacité analytique »), est un point de départ utile. 
Cependant, comme les résultats de cet article le montrent, si 
la capacité est l’habileté à fournir des conseils efficaces con-
cernant des problèmes déterminés, alors la nature du pro-
blème lui-même (aussi « pernicieux » soit-il) aura aussi un 
impact sur la capacité. 
 
Mots clefs. Adaptation au changement climatique, finance, 
capacité politique, dispositifs de gouvernance 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since at least the mid 1990s, public officials and informed 
observers of policymakers have obsessed over the impact of 
policy capacity (or the lack thereof) on the effectiveness of 
government.  Academics and veteran public officials have 
offered a range of views on what is often portrayed as a 
“crisis” in eroding policy capacity, suggesting strategies that 
might improve capacity (Peters 1996, CPRN 2009 and An-
derson 2008).  Academically, “Policy capacity” has been 
variously represented as being “hollowed out” in light of 
globalization and the general erosion of the state (Cerny and 
Gummett 1996); as having been reconfigured given econom-
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ic integration’s preference for liberalization and the new 
public management (Conley 2002); as having the potential 
for rescue, given improved public finances in places like 
Canada in the early part of the new century (Bakvis 2000); 
or as a chimeral goal given the extent to which all of this 
navel gazing over capacity continues to assume an instru-
mentally rational conception of the policy process which is 
theoretically problematic and empirically moribund (Par-
sons 2004).  All of this highlights the extent to which “policy 
capacity” has emerged as a central concern in modern gov-
ernance despite the fact we have never fully grappled with 
how to assess the quality of policy capacity – the concept 
remains nebulous and poorly operationalized in much of this 
work.  While it has been taken as given that “good” policy 
requires that officials have the capacity to engage in effective 
learning, analysis tends to therefore focus on increasing 
capacity without having first specified the conditions under 
which we can say capacity is high or low, for example. 
Arguably, this obsession with capacity has developed in 
isolation from other currents in the policy field.  Much of the 
policy literature highlights institutional and political obsta-
cles to effective policy capacity, contributing to a general 
pessimism regarding the role of policy analysis in improving 
the quality of government at all. Whether based on the limi-
tations to rational decision making (Lindbolm 1979), or 
“garbage cans” replete with different policy ideas in search of 
problems (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972), or “discourse 
intuitionalism” and its break with any sense that policy 
analyses involves seeking problem solving advice at all 
(Schmidt 2008), much of the policy literature has reinforced 
a view that governments’ analytical capacities are fundamen-
tally limited - at least in terms of their ability to engage in 
evidence-based policy learning. Unfortunately this means 
that while policy capacity is a key concern, it is not a well 
examined or tested concept.  Governments see it as vital, 
while academics see it as a tangential issue that perhaps 
misses the point of what actually “drives” policy change.   
 
The problem with this is that a great deal more can, and 
should, be said about capacity.  It is entirely possible to think 
about capacity in ways which integrate both the rational 
instrumental notion of capacity (Parsons 2004) and the 
broader lessons from the policy literature on the extent to 
which governance arrangements and relations amongst 
stakeholders may also impact capacity.  Simply put, if gov-
ernments want “good” policy advice in light of increasingly 
complex policy problems (like those implied by climate 
change adaptation), it is possible to conceptualize where and 
how capacity might be better or worse, by thinking about a 
broader range of factors that impact policy making. 
For example, while recent research has attempted to get at 
capacity by exploring the skills and capabilities of policy 
analysts, defined as “analytical capacity” (Oliphant and 
Howlett 2010, Howlett and Newman 2010), suggesting 
implicitly that better training and more “slack” in day to day 
policy work for the purposes of longer term, directed, re-
search might improve capacity, it nonetheless remains the 
case that the knowledge policy makers bring to effective 
learning in their domains will be impeded or facilitated by 
more explicitly political considerations such as institutional 
and jurisdictional limitations of agencies involved in policy 
work - the “governance arrangements” under which analyti-
cal capacity is employed.  
For example, in Canadian financial services, studies of 
governance arrangements have raised doubts about relations 
amongst key policymakers and the ability of the sector to 
implement major policy changes. Most research has high-
lighted the role of federalism, and the degree to which fi-
nance is a divided jurisdiction in mitigating effective policy 
design.  Other research has suggested traditionally weak 
federal government governance due to the disinterest of the 
Bank of Canada in questions of industry regulation (Cole-
man 1996).  Others have noted the weakness of the federal 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) 
in policy debates given the Provinces’ key role in regulating 
the securities industry (Harris 2010) and the weakness of the 
Department of Finance in guiding policy given the high level 
of political interference in key policy debates in the sector 
(Harris 2004).  Thus no matter how much analytical capaci-
ty may exist within finance agencies, effective policy capacity 
may be much lower if governance arrangements are this 
poor. 
This paper offers a preliminary examination of some of the 
key challenges confronting policymaking capacity in relation 
to the finance sector and the challenges of climate change 
adaptation.  The paper combines an overview of the institu-
tional arrangements with an assessment of the resources 
governments has deployed in support of policy analysis, in 
part based on a survey of policy professionals.  While a broad 
overview suggests that policy capacity on this issue may be 
uneven in the finance sector, given institutional arrange-
ments and the low awareness of the issue amongst finance 
officials, a single illustrative case of adaptation, the pruden-
tial oversight of the insurance and pension industries in light 
of the climate change risk (focusing on the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions - OSFI), highlights 
the challenges of capacity in this area.  The findings highlight 
the extent to which the nature of a particular policy problem 
itself, how complex it is, or how much a solution might chal-
lenge existing institutional arrangements etc. is also crucial 
in understanding “policy capacity”.   Despite many observ-
ers’ claims that climate change adaptation should be a big 
concern for prudential regulators, OSFI clearly believes it is 
a small concern, not central to their activities, reflecting the 
extent to which climate change adaptation issues challenge 
both institutional and analytical capacity in this sector. 
 
Public Policy Capacity and Policy Learning 
 
Understandings of policy “learning”, the extent to which 
policymakers in a particular domain might be able to adapt 
to new issues, events and the availability of new information 
have tended to emphasize two sets of factors.  They stress the 
“analytical capacity” of policymakers in leading government 
agencies, in terms of their accumulated knowledge, skills 
and their willingness to meaningfully engage with new in-
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formation on one hand, and the structure of the policy sub-
system – the relationship between those agencies and the 
broader universe of policy actors on the other.   Indeed, as 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009 argue, Hall (1993) and 
Sabatier (1987) both highlight that conventional thinking 
about policy learning suggests effective learning, the kind of 
learning that generates programmatic responses to real 
problems, the kind associated with Hall’s notion of “social 
learning” for example, requires that policymakers have 
sufficient analytical capabilities in an environment in which 
the policy-making system is both “open” to new actors or 
new policy ideas and “integrated” to the extent that policy 
research organizations can disseminate new ideas to relevant 
authorities.  However, if analytical capacity in a sector is 
limited and governance arrangements are not integrated or 
conducive to learning and disseminating new advice, author-
ities will fail to respond in a programmatic fashion to new 
challenges; an environment in which expertise is devoted to 
“fire fighting” rather than more systematic research. 
 
Figure 1 - Typology of Policy Capacity 
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As suggested by Figure 1, sectors that have integrated gov-
ernance arrangements but limited analytical capacity will 
also struggle with effective learning as no matter how well 
organized the channels for disseminating policy advice 
might be (or how much appetite there might be for new 
ideas), agencies lack the ability to produce the advice neces-
sary for significant policy changes. Logically, one might 
expect an analytical process marked by limited incremental-
ism, given the lack of resources necessary for examining 
previously unpracticed ideas.  Conversely, in a sector where 
analytical capacity is high, but governance arrangements are 
less integrated, a number of outcomes seem possible.  For 
example, if there are multiple institutions charged with 
overlapping mandates, analytical capacity may be used 
“badly” to support competing agencies and competing politi-
cal agendas.  Less instrumentally, agencies may simply rec-
ommend contradictory policies in the absence of coordina-
tion.  Ineffective governance arrangements could also be 
conducive to “passing the buck” on dealing with complex 
new challenges, as ambiguity about responsibilities may 
create an environment where agencies assume “someone 
else” will deal with the issue.  Finally, in this type of envi-
ronment, it might also be logical to suggest that there is 
more scope for politicization of analytical capacity.  If the 
sector is poorly integrated and therefore lacks internal co-
herence on policy problems there is greater scope for analyt-
ical capacity to be used for more explicitly “political” purpos-
es.   
 
This said, empirically assessing “analytical capacity” and the 
degree of “integration” of governance arrangements are not 
easy tasks.  Furthermore this problem is made even more 
difficult in that assessing analytical capacity and governance 
arrangements in relation to a particular policy problem also 
requires some sense of what the structure, or properties, of 
the problem itself are. 
For example, “analytical capacity” has proven difficult to 
study.  Little systematic effort has been made to examine the 
nature of policy work inside government. There is little 
information available on existing analytical capacity even in 
a sector as large and as important as finance. Reviewing the 
existing literature suggests that we know very little about the 
scope of research activities in different organizations, the 
amount of analytical resources those agencies may have at 
their disposal and the competency of their policy analysts. 
While Figure 1 suggests a basic distinction between “high” 
and “low” analytical capacity, the task of interpreting the 
level of analytical capacity in any sector is difficult, particu-
larly in relation to specific policy problems, as in the case of 
climate change adaptation. As will be discussed below, in the 
finance case, analytical capacity is thought to be quite high 
(at least at the federal level), however, assessment of the CEI 
data suggests that climate change adaptation does not re-
ceive a proportionate share of attention in the sector.  In this 
case the issue may simply be too small or peripheral in the 
view of existing agencies, for existing analytical capacity to 
be well utilized. 
Assessing the quality of governance arrangements is 
somewhat easier then analytical capacity, at least in relation 
to finance, as a considerable amount is already known about 
the basic structure of responsibilities and relationships in 
the sector: at least at the Federal level, there is significant 
apparatus in place designed to “integrate” the flow of infor-
mation in the sector and agencies assigned specific research 
and evaluation tasks.  However, as will be discussed below, 
the sector may be well “integrated” in relation to some issues 
but not others.  In the absence of integrated governance 
arrangements, no matter how high the existing pool of ana-
lytical capacity, the advice produced by policy staff is unlike-
ly to be utilized effectively.  The quality of governance ar-
rangements is obviously particularly important in relation to 
climate change adaptation as the issues involved inevitably 
cross federal, provincial and local government lines and 
often link across different policy domains; the problems 
associated with climate change adaptation likely pose unique 
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challenges for the federal division of responsibilities in the 
finance sector – the sector may be well “integrated” in rela-
tion to some issues but not others. 
Governance Arrangements and Policymaking 
in Finance 
 
The central role of Departments of Finance in overseeing 
government activities has been widely commented on for 
decades.  Finance has extensive policy analytical capacity as 
ultimately it plays a role in all policy sectors through its 
management of the public purse.  Finance agencies also tend 
to be highly involved in all international processes in relation 
to climate change cooperation, as they play a leading role in 
representing international economic interests.  While this 
suggests a large role for Finance in relation to all aspects of 
climate change adaptation as a central coordinating agency, 
the policy-making dynamics are not well documented, par-
ticularly those regarding finance authorities’ responsibilities 
for overseeing and regulating the financial industry. 
Financial services policy-making has evolved considerably 
in recent decades largely due to globalization and industry 
deregulation.  Prior to the Mulroney Conservative Govern-
ment’s decision to deregulate the financial services industry 
in the 1980s, the sector was segmented into several different 
industries.  The mortgage and trust industry and the securi-
ties industry were provincially regulated and outside of 
federal jurisdiction.  Banking, under the Constitution Act 
(1982), was a federal jurisdiction.  Market segmentation had 
been pursued to achieve a number of different policy goals 
(Harris 1999).  In particular, it kept commercial banking 
(dominated by the “big banks” separate from investment 
banking (the “securities industry”).  It also established dis-
tinct policy domains for financial services as federal policy-
making focused almost exclusively on banking, while provin-
cial authorities were responsible for regulating investment 
functions in relation to the securities industry – the policy 
responsibilities of public finance officials in relation to pri-
vate sector regulation were effectively organized into sepa-
rate independent silos.  Prior to deregulation, federal bank-
ing policy described as a highly integrated policy community 
(or “subgovernment”) in which only the leading industry 
participants, and the Department of Finance, played a signif-
icant role in policymaking (Coleman 1996).  Policy develop-
ments were guided by a close set of informal personal rela-
tions between industry and government officials (Harris 
1999) which supported a tight consensus in policy goals.   
Deregulation altered policymaking dynamics (Williams 
2009). In the private sector, the banks emerged as the lead-
ing players in the new environment.  They came to dominate 
the provincial securities sector, took over the remaining 
second tier of local (trust company) banks and began to 
further diversify their operations into insurance.  Despite 
this emerging market dominance, post-deregulation policy-
making has become far more complex as policy debates were 
increasingly “politicized” (Harris 2004, Williams 2004).  A 
number of previously uninvolved, or unimportant, players 
emerged as key stakeholders leading to a far more open and 
public set of policy debates and one where there is signifi-
cant institutional competition between federal and provin-
cial agencies. In this environment, despite some relatively 
small developments, policy change since deregulation has 
proven difficult. 
For example, constant proposals for the creation of a na-
tional securities regulator have gone nowhere – despite 
broadly accepted analyses that this is a “good idea” in light of 
the complexity of the industry.  During deregulation the 
federal government promised some sort of plan to regulate 
the newly integrated securities industry, and has continued 
to pursue a variety of strategies to get the provinces to agree 
to federally-coordinated reform of securities regulation - 
indeed the federal government would like to assert Constitu-
tional jurisdiction over the sector. However several provinc-
es have jealously defended their remaining tenuous control 
over the securities industry (Roberge 2005), even in light of 
lessons of the recent financial crisis in which their “supervi-
sion” appears to have been inadequate (Harris 2010, Wil-
liams 2011).   
Similarly there has been a long festering problem relating 
to the division between the insurance and banking indus-
tries.  The federal government had intended to allow banks 
to not only own insurance company subsidiaries which they 
gained the power to do in 1992, but that eventually banks 
would be allowed to directly sell insurance “in branch” as 
they now sell securities.  This has not occurred.  Insurance 
companies, eager to defend their turf, have become powerful 
players in the policy subsystem blocking any policy changes 
which would improve the competitive position of banks 
relative to insurance companies, and have recently managed 
to “push back” against banks encroachment into the insur-
ance sector based on web-based marketing and sales of 
insurance products.  Again despite considerable analysis in 
support of removing the remaining “pillarized” obstacles to 
more diverse consumer services, policymaking dynamics 
have impeded change. A similar observation could be made 
about industry conglomeration (Williams 2004).   
While many have become embittered by the “gridlock” in 
the sector, the broader point is that the prospects for collab-
oration and policy learning across the fiancé sector as a 
whole has been poor. The new mix of actors in the policy 
subsystem have all been pursuing irreconcilable agendas.  
The question is: to what extent do these dynamics impact 
policy capacity across the finance sector in relation to new 
challenges like climate change adaptation? 
 
Integration and Governance Arrangements  
in Finance 
Despite this broad subsystem context, it does seem nonethe-
less that governance arrangements in the finance sector are 
well integrated, except in those areas where there are “juris-
dictional problems”; such as securities industry regulation, 
where ongoing constitutional struggles have undermined 
effective policy analysis (Harris 2010, Williams 2011).  The 
Department of Finance is undoubtedly the central agency in 
the sector.  It has a coordinating role over both other de-
partments internal to government finance, through its con-
trol of the budget, and in relation to the finance domain 
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specifically; it has a central coordinating role over other 
regulatory and policymaking institutions.  Indeed, since the 
financial crisis, this role has been formalized as a Finance 
Assistant Deputy Minister now chairs FISC – which is the 
central committee tasked with coordination of the different 
Canadian finance authorities - FISC brings Finance together 
with the Bank of Canada, the Canadian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions, and if, it is ever created, a representative of the 
national securities regulator.  FISC is intended to be a cen-
tral “clearing house” for broad issues relating to finance.  
Through these kinds of mechanisms, Finance is well sup-
ported by its associate federal agencies in policy analyses – 
in particular the Bank of Canada and an increasingly well 
staffed OSFI. 
In terms of how all this may impact policy capacity in rela-
tion to climate change, the governance arrangements appear 
to be integrated except in those areas requiring federal and 
provincial cooperation and coordination; in those areas 
governance arrangements are not integrated, and in fact are 
often quite conflictual.1   
From the perspective of operationalizing the typology of 
policy capacity, this is nonetheless a bit problematic.  The 
sector is more or less integrated depending on how the issue 
interacts with existing organizational mandates and jurisdic-
tions.  This suggests that if we wish to think about integra-
tion in relation to specific policy problems we need to see it 
as a continuum rather than a single characterization.  At one 
end, on policy questions “internal” to federal responsibilities, 
government arrangements are well integrated.  At the other 
end of the continuum, issues that cross federal/provincial 
boundaries are not well integrated.  Issues that are solely a 
federal responsibility but involve networked governance 
with arms length regulatory bodies and private sector actors 
likely fit somewhere between these two extremes.  Thus, 
deciding how “integrated” governance arrangements might 
be in this sector first requires a narrow operationalization of 
a climate change policy challenge and who the relevant 
authorities might be. 	  
The Structure of the Climate Change Problem in 
Finance 
At broad level, climate change introduces new mandates for 
policy analyses to finance authorities, requiring that either 
existing analytical resources be tasked with this responsibil-
ity, integrating ideas about climate change into their ongoing 
work, or through the addition of new resources.  Unlike 
some “smaller” policy domains, finance has considerable 
policy analytical capacity to begin with.  Finance depart-
ments and their associated organizations have large policy 
staffs as a result of their relatively central role in policy ad-
vising (given their control over budget’s etc.).  That said, 
climate change is a significant new mandate, which could 
overtax those resources. 
Indeed climate change adaptation is a complex issue in the 
finance sector as it generates several different analytical 
challenges.  On the one hand, all internal government poli-
cies and programs in response to climate change must in 
some way be overseen by the Department of Finance – this is 
certainly revealed in the Department of Finance’s 
DPRs/RPPs.  For example, Finance is responsible for design-
ing and implementing carbon taxes, supporting green initia-
tives within government and providing funds for new energy 
sources and transportation projects responding to environ-
mental concerns.  The scope of the analytical challenges 
involved in this ultimately touches on all aspects of govern-
ment policy on adaptation.  Furthermore, Finance plays a 
central role in coordinating international initiatives on cli-
mate change, as it is almost always the case that senior Fi-
nance officials play the leading role in Canada’s international 
deliberations relating to economic policy – indeed the sheer 
volume of mentions of international issues relating to cli-
mate change on the Department of Finance’s website sug-
gests this is a particular preoccupation of whatever analytical 
capacity exists inside the organization in relation to climate 
change activities. 
The challenges do not stop there, however.  As highlighted 
above, Finance is also responsible for overseeing the finan-
cial services industry and therefore has responsibility for 
evaluating climate change issues as they touch on industry 
regulation.  Two climate change concerns are particularly 
important in this light.  First, as has been widely recognized 
by the financial services industry for almost a decade, both 
long-term climate changes (that may significantly challenge 
local economic activities) as well as increasing climate insta-
bility, pose prudential risks to certain kinds of financial 
service companies and financial products.2 Regulatory au-
thorities need to integrate knowledge about likely climate 
impacts into assessments of financial risk, particularly in 
relation to the insurance industry and pension investments.  
Second, to the extent to which managing climate change may 
require the redirection of private investment to either more 
carbon-responsible practices, or simply towards adaptive 
industries and green technologies, finance authorities also 
may have a role through nodality and treasure based policy 
instruments in encouraging new priorities for the invest-
ment community. 
While the links between these aspects of the climate 
change issue and particular agencies (Figure 2) is an over-
generalization, it is important to note that these different 
issues speak directly to the continuum of sectoral integration 
discussed above.  Issues that logically “fit” the mandate of a 
single agency in the federal finance ensemble, given that 
agency’s existing role, seem to fit the existing apparatus for 
“integration” in the sector – such as is the case for prudential 
regulation relating to climate change risks. Broader issues, 
those that require new collaboration inside and out of gov-
ernment may raise challenges from an integration perspec-
tive, depending on how those challenges cut across existing 
organizational mandates.  For example issues relating to 
private investment concerns are likely to be tackled in poorly 
integrated environment as these cross federal/provincial 
jurisdictional lines and would require new collaborative 
mechanisms with the private sector. 
What all this suggests is that while the integration of gov-
ernance arrangements matters in assessing policy capacity, 
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we need to balance that against an analysis of the problems 
confronting that sector.   
 
Fig. 2 - Finance Sector Issue Structure and Key Agencies 
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In a sense, this is a bit obvious in that it amounts to saying 
that government’s policy capacity is likely to be more effec-
tive where problems “fit” existing responsibilities. 
 
Assessing Analytical Capacity – Lessons 
from the Survey Data 
 
As alluded to above, assessing “analytical capacity” is a bit 
nebulous.  On the surface, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that analytical capacity on financial services issues is quite 
high, at least at the federal level.  A review of the budgets of 
key federal agencies suggests that the Department of Fi-
nance, OSFI and the Bank of Canada should all have consid-
erable capacity in terms of staff resources etc.  - OSFI’s 
budget for monitoring the financial industry was over $90 
million in 2011.  Furthermore, the policy advice and support 
offered to Finance by the Bank of Canada and OSFI seems 
particularly valuable in that staff are encouraged to see 
themselves as serious researchers (Bank staff are notable for 
publishing their own research findings).  These agencies’ 
budgets have grown considerably over the last decade.   
On top of this, several recent survey projects have illustrat-
ed that policy staff in central agencies have considerably 
more “capacity” in terms of their training, education, time 
and research competencies to engage in more sophisticated 
policy analysis than is the case for other types of government 
agencies (See for example, Wellstead et al. 2009).  Indeed 
these kind of “cognitive” capacities for policy analysis seem 
to be much higher in the larger, more formalized “policy 
shops” that exist in the Federal Government’s central agen-
cies.  On the other hand, there is considerable reason to 
question the provinces’ analytical capacity (Howlett and 
Newman 2010). 
In theory this general pattern should be pronounced in the 
finance sector.  While provincial finance ministries are quite 
large and well staffed, their mandates are much narrower 
than the federal Department of Finance, and they are not 
supported by the high quality satellite agencies charged with 
particular policy roles that serve the federal government – 
provincial securities regulators, for example, in some in-
stances are virtually “shell” organizations with little perma-
nent staff and analytical capacity.  Indeed survey data col-
lected tends to support this conclusion.3 Generally, Provin-
cial officials are not as well educated, are less likely to have 
training in the social sciences and policy analysis, and are 
broadly more likely to have a background in business admin-
istration (this is not true of those who work in finance agen-
cies specifically, though the samples get quite small for that 
category in any event) – See Williams 2011b for a detailed 
discussion of federal-provincial differences.   
General observations aside, what is most interesting to 
note from the survey data is that while analytical capacity 
might be high in federal finance circles, awareness of, or 
attention to climate change issues is actually lower than is 
the case of Canadian policy professionals broadly – a con-
cerning result given the central importance of finance on 
these issues. 
 
Assessing the Data: 
Firstly, as one would expect, finance officials (both federal 
and provincial), tend to be more highly trained than non-
finance officials – suggesting higher analytical capacity.  
They are more likely to have a graduate or professional de-
gree (Table 1), are more likely to have done policy-specific 
post-secondary course work (Table 2) and likely to have 
more content specific educational training for their respon-
sibilities in finance given that they are more likely to have 
trained in the social sciences or business administration  
Table 1 
  Education levels in the 
Public Service     
 
Non-Finance Finance 
High School 1.14% 5.36 
College-Tech School 8.24% 5.36% 
University 32.39% 25.00% 
Graduate or professional 
degree 58.24% 64.29% 
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Table 2 
Number of Post-Secondary Policy-Specific courses undertake 
 
Non-Finance Finance 
None 38.53% 28.85% 
One 11.76% 9.62% 
Two 13.82% 11.54% 
Three or More 35.88% 50.00% 
 
Table 3 
  Differences in Type of Education 
  
 
Non-Finance Finance 
Business or 
Administration 7.81% 25.51% 
Computing 
Science 1.30% 0.00% 
Fine 
Arts/Humanities 2.60% 1.02% 
Journalism 0.93% 1.02% 
Engineering 7.06% 3.06% 
Law 1.49% 6.12% 
Natural Scienc-
es 32.53% 1.02% 
Social Sciences 14.13% 19.39% 
*Numbers do not add up to 
100% because of non-response 
  
 
Table 4 
  Level of Concern About Climate Change     
 
Non-
Finance Finance 
How concerned are you personally about 
climate change? 3.998 3.542 
How concerned is your department or agency 
about climate change? 3.845 2.97 
Compared with other issues that your de-
partment or agency deals with, how much of a 
priority are issues related to adaptation to 
climate change? 
3.16 2.239 
Overall, how would you rate your department 
or agency's capacity to deal with adaptation 
to climate change? 
2.287 2.594 
How relevant are issues related to climate 
change adaptation to your daily work? 3.37 2.015 
How relevant are issues related to climate 
change adaptation to the mission of your 
department or agency? 
3.796 2.478 
How relevant are issues related to climate 
change adaptation ot the daily operations of 
your agency or department? 
3.236 2.212 
Does your department or agency's work help 
to increase capacity to adapt to climate 
change? 
3.824 2.507 
Numbers reflect mean rating per group on 1-5 
scale, where 1=not at all concerned and 
5=very concerned 
   
 
  
 
Table 5 
Familiarity with and Attitudes Towards 
Climate Change     
 
Non-
Finance Finance 
I understand the concept of adaptation to 
climate change 4.27 3.64 
I understand the key issues surrounding 
adaptation to climate change 4.05 3.34 
Information regarding adaptation to climate 
change is readily available to me 3.76 3.25 
The body of knowledge regarding adaptation 
to climate change is growing 4.07 3.82 
Climate change is affecting policy decisions 
in my organization 3.53 2.58 
Information regarding adaptation to climate 
change is understood within my organization 3.18 2.54 
There is an increased desire for information 
regarding adaptation within my organization 3.44 2.43 
Within my organization there exists a gen-
eral consensus regarding the need for 
adaptation 
3.39 2.41 
My organization is more aware of adaptation 
to climate change issues than 3 years ago 3.81 2.85 
Mitigation should be considered part of a 
larger adaptation strategy 3.92 3.25 
International agreements will affect domestic 
adaptation policies . . 
Adaptation will require changes in citizen 
behaviour . . 
Policies should bev harmonized across 
jurisdictions . . 
Numbers reflect mean use rating per group on 1-5 scale, 
where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree 
 
"." Reflects no significant difference 
   
 
than is the case for policy professionals generally. That said, 
it is interesting to note that while almost 33% of officials 
have an educational background in the natural sciences, in 
finance this is true of only 1% (See Table 3).  This may help 
explain the low awareness of climate change adaptation 
challenges in the sector.While previous survey projects have 
taken this type of evidence to suggest that analytical capacity 
is likely higher in finance agencies, much like the discussion 
of governance arrangements above, once we focus on a spe-
cific issue, like climate change adaptation, the results are 
more complicated.  Indeed, the starkest findings in the sur-
vey relate to the gap between finance officials and non-
finance officials on awareness of, engagement in, and con-
cern about, climate change adaptation issues.  For example, 
in assessing the level of concern about climate change (Table 
4), while finance officials are more confident than other 
officials that their agencies could deal with adaptation ques-
tions, they tend to see the issue as being less important to 
themselves and to their agency - something revealed in the 
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case study as well (below).  Furthermore their knowledge 
about climate change issues is lower; they are more skeptical 
about climate change knowledge and are less positive about 
the extent to which finance organizations are dealing with 
that knowledge (Table 5). 
Indeed, when examining the information sources used by 
officials in their policy work, again there are interesting 
differences between non-finance and finance officials.  While 
non-finance officials are far more likely to use “scientific 
findings” and “academic research” in their analysis, finance 
officials rely more heavily on “personal experience”, “opin-
ions” and “reports from industry” (Table 6).  Perhaps most 
importantly, while 70% of non-finance officials report hav-
ing some direct involvement in climate change related policy 
work, only 17% of finance officials report the same (Insert 
Figure 3). 
 
Table 6 
  Types of Information Sources Used in Policy Work (both 
Climate-Related and not) 
 
Non-Finance Finance 
Academic Research 3.24 2.73 
Budget and Cost Data . . 
Conference Presentations . . 
Government Platforms . . 
Newspapers and News 
magazines 2.89 3.66 
Personal Experience 3.5 3.94 
Personal Opinion 3.02 3.39 
Professional Advice . . 
Reports from Consultants . . 
Reports from Foreign Gov-
ernments . . 
Reports from Industry 2.56 2.96 
Reports from NGOs . . 
Reports from other domestic 
gov . . 
Reports from Think Tanks . . 
Reports produced within your 
gov . . 
Results of formal evaluation . . 
Scientific Findings 3.12 1.78 
Survey data . . 
Workshops 2.58 2.34 
Numbers reflect mean use rating per group on 1-5 scale, where 
1=never and 5=daily 
"." Reflects no significant 
difference 
   
	  
What emerges from this data?  Albeit based on a relatively 
small sample, it tends to confirm the general sense that 
analytical capacity is high in the finance sector; however very 
little of that capacity is actively engaged in climate change 
related policy work.  Indeed the data seems to suggest that 
finance officials, more commonly trained in business and 
public administration, with little connection to the natural 
sciences, tend to be skeptical of the importance of adaptation 
as a major policy concern in their domain.  Much like the 
case above with assessing the integration of governance 
arrangements, it seems reasonable to suggest here that 
analytical capacity in finance, although generally high, will 
be lower on issues that are well outside of existing compe-
tencies - for example issues that require more scientific 
knowledge about likely climate impacts. 
 
The Micro Context – the Office of the Superinten-
dent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) 
As the survey data reveals, suggesting that analytical capaci-
ty in finance should be high, given staff levels etc., does not 
really tell us much about analytical capacity in relation to 
climate change per se as these agencies have large analytical 
mandates to begin with.  In order to “get at” climate change 
capacity in particular, an examination of OSFI’s climate 
change related activities seems to suggest that when there is 
a clearly recognized adaptation problem in the finance sec-
tor, and that problems can be handled in a well integrated 
policy environment where agencies’ existing mandates “fit” 
the task at hand, climate change capacity appears to be 
“effective”. 
As Canada’s prudential regulator, OSFI is primarily re-
sponsible for assessing risks in relation to firms’ financial 
holdings and certain kinds of financial assets.  OSFI is not 
only responsible for making sure banks are sufficiently cov-
ered against risk in their portfolios, but also that insurance 
companies are sufficiently covered against potential liabili-
ties and for assessing the long term soundness of pension 
funds.  In recent years the range of “risks” OSFI has ostensi-
bly been monitoring has expanded.  For example, in the 
wake of 9/11, OSFI became involved in monitoring “terrorist 
16.90%!
 70.35%!
Finance	  
Non-­‐Finance	  
Figure 4: Involvement With  Climate Change-
Related Work!
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financing”.  More recently, OSFI has also been increasingly 
monitoring prudential risks associated with climate change 
adaptation.   
Ideas about the risks posed to pension funds and insurance 
companies due to climate change have been circulating for 
some time; and have generated considerable international 
public and private attention.  Indeed the issue is relatively 
straightforward – rapid climate change or increased climatic 
instability creates new prudential risks for firms over ex-
posed to certain kinds of activities – for example a regional 
insurance company overly involved in agricultural insur-
ance, could be at serious risk over the long term as climate 
change challenges existing agricultural practices (See Hecht 
2008 for a discussion).  This requires that prudential regula-
tors take these types of concerns into consideration in their 
ongoing oversight of private firms. 
Since 2007 OSFI’s various annual reports and industry 
assessments have made increasingly frequent mentions of 
the prudential risks associated with weather risks associated 
with climate change – indeed OSFI is monitoring these 
concerns within its oversight on the insurance and pension 
industries.4  Mirroring OSFI’s new responsibility for moni-
toring terrorist financing the organization has added climate 
change risks to its list of concerns – indeed climate change 
adaptation concerns, with their focus on “risks” to firms and 
whole sectors, should neatly fit the existing analytical activi-
ties of the organization.  On top of this OSFI’s budget has 
grown considerably in recent years to help it deal with its 
generally expanding mandate.  Where once OSFI was seen as 
an underfunded and ineffective organization, its budget has 
more than doubled between 1996 and 2009.  Indeed OSFI 
has devoted ever-increasing resources to assessing insurance 
industry and pension fund risk in particular – which could 
help provide the additional analytical capacity necessary to 
monitoring climate risks. 
That said, it is not clear how serious OSFI’s activities are in 
this area. OSFI may mention these concerns in its broader 
reviews of financial assets, and in some sense seems to be-
lieve the issue is being “dealt with” as far as OSFI’s mandate 
requires. However, it is very difficult to get anyone at OSFI 
to actually speak about climate change issues and the risks 
they pose for the industry.  For example, in response to 
requests for more information about OSFI and climate 
change, staff re-direct inquiries to the Institute for Cata-
strophic Loss Reduction, a private sector funded not for 
profit research organization that has published some work 
documenting industry risks due to climate change as OSFI 
has no reports or documents hat outline their own concerns; 
OSFI has not developed any sort of concrete policy state-
ment outlining how to assess risks in relation to this issue.  
Thus, despite annual report mentions to climate change 
risks, OSFI seems to lack accurate information about how to 
assess these risks, something also implied by the terminolo-
gy used by the Superintendent. There are no “products” that 
can be identified demonstrating a serious level of engage-
ment with the issue.  Indeed, given OSFI’s penchant for ad 
hoc relational regulation, taking the peculiarities of each 
firm’s situation in a different light, guidelines are unlikely in 
any event.  This does make it difficult to judge the scope of 
their analytical activities in this area however.   
Equivocation aside, on the surface it appears we have an 
agency confronting a clearly identifiable and new problem 
which fits within the responsibilities it has been assigned 
within the federal finance ensemble; an agency which has 
considerable existing analytical capacity for assessing risk; 
capacity that has expanded in recent years, and an agency 
which claims to be monitoring the problem.  While this 
suggests governance arrangements on this issue are good, 
mirroring the general data (above) on analytical capacity in 
the finance sector, the situation at OSFI also seems to sug-
gest that the issue is conceptually difficult for finance offi-
cials to deal with, given their experience and training which 
connect poorly with the natural-science properties of the 
climate change adaptation debate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What conclusions can be drawn about policy capacity in the 
finance sector in relation to climate change based on the 
available evidence and how does this speak to the difficulty 
of operationalizing capacity?  As suggested by Figure 1, 
effective policy capacity requires that there be both sufficient 
analytical capacity to assess the challenges confronting a 
policy sector and good integration in governance arrange-
ments in order to ensure that analytical capacity is well 
utilized.  In the case of OSFI and its responsibility for over-
seeing risks to the financial sector, both of these conditions 
seem to exist in theory.  Climate change risks clearly fit the 
existing responsibilities and lines of accountability in rela-
tion to this kind of prudential oversight at the federal level.  
Analytical capacity seems to be high across the finance sector 
generally, and significant new resources have been allocated 
to OSFI in recent years.  There is a perceived policy problem 
in the sector, and the officials responsible for it claim to have 
the information they need to deal with the problem.  Though 
as the data suggests above, financial officials at generally do 
not seem to be taking the issue very seriously, even relative 
to private sector think tanks.  All of this seems to suggest 
that the properties of the issue itself, both how it challenges 
existing governance arrangements and how it may challenge 
the analytical skills and orientations of administrators, is 
important in assessing capacity. 
Furthermore, on other climate change related policy chal-
lenges, finance governance arrangements are not well inte-
grated, particularly those that cross into areas of provincial 
jurisdiction, and while analytical capacity may be high in 
general, the available survey data suggests that finance offi-
cials have a low awareness of climate change issues and are 
rarely involved in policy work that addresses these challeng-
es – policy capacity also depends on the properties of the 
problem itself. 
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Endnotes	  
1  Indeed in the mismanagement of the regulation of the securities 
at the centre of the $32 billion Asset Backed Commercial Paper 
market collapse exposed by the global financial crisis, there has 
been considerable finger-pointing and accusations by both levels 
of government, highlighting how broken the arrangements are 
in that sector (Williams 2011). 
2  See for example the analysis done by the United Nations Envi-
ronment Program Finance Initiative. 
3  The survey, completed in 2010, was directed to government 
policy analysts and administrators working in federal and pro-
vincial government policy analysis.  Aside from examining the 
officials’ knowledge of climate change adaptation challenges, it 
also sought information on their research experience, compe-
tencies, educational backgrounds and most interestingly, the or-
ganization of their policy related research activities in govern-
ment.  A total of 636 officials completed the survey, of which 185 
(29%) worked for the federal government. Within the overall to-
tal,. 15% of the respondents self-identified as working in a “fi-
nance-related” agency. 
4  See for example the 2007-2008 annual report. 
